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Abstract The analysis of the competitive environment of international organizations
has been neglected in scholarly research. Both the external and the internal type of
competition in international organizations are rather weak and their performance is
far from ideal. To strengthen both types of competition, several tentative proposals
are advanced. They range from the introduction of an international competition
agency, competition rules, a monitoring institute, voucher systems, matching
contributions, popular participation rights by citizens to the use of prediction
markets and institutionalized devil’s advocates. These proposals are put forward to
stimulate discussion and to advance new ideas about the design of international
organizations.
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International organizations are arguably in trouble. They face great challenges lying
in the future such as the quest and struggle for resources, the possibility of state
failures, the problems and forces associated with globalization, terrorism and the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. These challenges will ask for global rather
than only national solutions. At the same time, as stated by The Economist (2008)
“Global institutions are an outdated muddle…the organizational response looks ever
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shabbier, slower and feebler.” International organization scholars have only partially
responded to the shortcomings identified.
An effort is made here to address some of the related issues.
This paper intends to make two specific contributions:
– Attention is called on the competitive environment—one, a few or many
competitors—in which international organizations act. While issues of inside
competition have found considerable attention in the literature, external
competition has been mostly disregarded. A recent survey article (Biermann
2008:153) states that international relations “research still is focused on
individual organizations,” at best concentrating on dyadic (micro-level)
interactions, but not on the macro-level interplay of a large number of
international organizations. There is a need to deal with the “market” as a
whole in which international organizations act. The entire system of interacting
organizations should be considered rather than particular organizations in
isolation.
– An effort is made to move from analysis to policy by advancing proposals to
improve the functioning of international organizations. They are specifically
designed to strengthen both internal and external competition. Scholars have
been rather reluctant to proceed in this direction. As long as our knowledge of
the working of specific institutions, as well as their interactions in the
international domain remains so limited, the proposals can indeed only be
suggestive. The proposals made here intend to stimulate discussion and are far
from suggesting a definite answer. Useful proposals must, of course, be based on
sound analysis. On the other hand, it is necessary to respond to existing
problems even if our knowledge is incomplete (which it will always be). It
should be kept in mind that if international organization scholars do not come
forth with ideas helping to overcome the problems that have been identified,
proposals will still be advanced but by persons even less knowledgeable and
with potentially serious negative consequences for global governance.
1 Analyzing International Organizations from the Point of View of Competition
The term “international organization” is used in a broad sense here;1 it encompasses
both International Governmental Organizations [IGOs, such as the UN and its sub-
organizations such as UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) or International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, World Trade Organization or EU] and Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs, i.e. umbrella organizations such as
the World Council of Churches or the European Trade Union Confederations). It also
includes non-profit-oriented transnational organizations such as the International
Olympic Committee, Amnesty International, Greenpeace or Transparency Interna-
1 For an extensive, but incomplete list see “List of International Organizations” in Wikipedia (http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_international_organizations; Non-governmental organizations; International_or-
ganization) all accessed January 29th, 2008.
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tional. These organizations have achieved increasing political influence over the past
decades (see e.g. Werker and Ahmed 2008:75). In several respects the term
“international organization” also refers to informal groups defined by self-appointed
membership such as G7, G8, G12, etc. They mainly differ from conventional IGOs
and NGOs by relying almost exclusively on the meeting of heads of state while the
respective bureaucratic organization is (still) weak or does not even exist. Yet these
international groups have gained great political and media prominence and should
therefore not be left out of account.
Standard economic theory sees the reason for international organizations to exist
mainly or even exclusively in the provision of public goods. The main problem is
seen to be the incentive to free ride, such that an undersupply of goods will result (e.g.
Congleton 2006). In contrast, for international private goods and services no
international organizations are needed; global firms and private interest groups are
able to provide the respective services.
This approach faces the problem that nearly all of international activities are, to
some extent, subject to free riding and to positive or negative external effects. In the
international sphere, the distinction between private and public goods is quite
blurred. The existence of an international organization should therefore not be seen
as a response to the “nature” of the good or service in question. Rather the existence
depends on how far reaching they are, and how precisely property rights are
assigned within the international sphere. Transaction costs as well as political
interests of national governments, private interest groups and existing international
organizations play a major role. These considerations imply that any international
activity can be provided by international organizations of a wide spectrum, from the
purely private to public organizations. The standard economic approach, which starts
by examining the character of goods (private or public), is of only limited
usefulness. This conclusion is buttressed by two additional considerations. Even in
the case of (pure) international public goods private supply does remain possible due
to pro-social preferences of individuals who voluntarily contribute.2 Pertinent
examples are the many humanitarian organizations that are active in the international
sphere. Moreover, in the case of some international public goods, government
interference is unwanted or even rejected. For example, the Red Cross, one of the
main actors supplying international public goods, emphasizes its independence and
autonomy from national governments, even though, it is heavily funded by them.
Modern Political Economy, focusing on internationally active individuals and
organizations and following a comparative approach, provides a more useful means
to analyze international organizations than the standard economic approach does (as
has long been argued by Vaubel 1986).
This paper, based on Political Economy, seeks to address the functioning of
international organizations by using the concept of competition in two different
areas:
– External competition (Section 2), i.e. the extent to which the market for
international organizations is open to outsiders;
2 For the extensive literature on the voluntary provision of international public goods see, e.g., Murdoch
and Sandler (1997) and Barrett (2007).
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– Internal competition (Section 3), i.e. the extent to which the preferences of
citizens are reflected in the actions taken by international organizations.
The analysis comes to the conclusion that both types of competition are severely
restricted and are lacking. Therefore, a number of innovations are suggested to
strengthen competition. Section 4 advances several proposals to strengthen external
and internal competition in the international realm. The proposals are, as will be
seen, rather unconventional and are intended to stimulate the scientific discourse.
Section 5 concludes.
2 External Competition
To come to terms with the interaction of international organizations in “international
markets” (where the demand for and the supply of goods and services meet) the
concept of external competition is used.3 External competition refers to the extent to
which a particular “international market” is “contestable” both with respect to entry
and exit. It must be analyzed how easily international organizations may become
active in a market, and how costly it is to leave it again. Entry may be undertaken by
newly founded organizations, or by international organizations presently engaged in
a different field.
The costs to enter may be prohibitive, in which case an existing international
organization has a monopoly on a particular market. An international monopoly
rarely is prevalent. With respect to some issues, the United Nations seems to have a
monopoly today, in particular the Security Council. But in many respects this
monopoly is challenged by competing international organizations, for example by
the “major” nations (the G7, G8, G12, or the caucus of mostly developing countries
called G77 which now comprises 130 members, etc.) convening in separate
meetings, and seeking solutions outside the UN framework. In many international
areas market entry is encumbered by substantial costs and the international market is
populated by a small number of organizations providing the same or similar goods.
The market is then characterized by oligopolistic competition. Examples in the
humanitarian field are “Amnesty International” and “Human Rights Watch,” both
organizations that care for prisoners and detainees. In the field of peacekeeping
operations the United Nations, the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and several other international organizations are sometimes simultas-
neously engaged. Finally, when entry costs are low a large number of international
organizations are competing with each other. Examples are the many humanitarian
institutions simultaneously working to relieve poverty and hunger, and to help in the
aftermath of natural disasters. The interaction of competing international organ-
izations may even result in an oversupply of a particular international good. An
example is the EU Commission, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development secretariat and the senior management of the IMF who all promoted
3 The term “competition” starts from the premise that international organizations are independent units,
each seeking the best outcome for itself. In contrast, “inter-organizational networking” (Biermann 2008)
implies that it is a beneficial “response to challenges of transnational character that single organizations
(and states) cannot master on their own” (p. 173).
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the liberalization of capital controls because they were competing with each other to
control the issue area (Steinwand and Stone 2008:127; Abdelal 2006).
“Contestability” also refers to the cost of exiting a market. This concept makes
immediate sense in the case of private profit-oriented firms. These must consider
whether they can take the profits with them and invest them elsewhere, or whether
they are locked in. This has been the case in some developing countries where the
national legislation prohibits the repatriation of profits. Firms take such restrictions
into account and consequently may shy away from foreign direct investments. The
concept is less straightforward in the case of non-profit oriented international
organizations. However, to the extent that inside competition is muted, employees of
international organizations are able to derive rents, i.e. various benefits they would
not get elsewhere. If, for some reason, the possibility to repatriate these benefits is
curtailed, the decision makers in international organizations are less willing to
engage in the respective area or country.
The entry (and possibly the exit) costs for international markets are important
aspects to consider, but they do not fully determine the number of competing
international organizations. Contestability is not exogenously given but is subject to
the manipulations of various actors. In particular, international organizations
engaged in a particular area make strong efforts to restrict market access to
newcomers by raising entry costs. Politicians and employees involved in
international organizations tend to restrict entry to gain for themselves more
prominence, to enjoy a “quiet life,” and to create extra rents (e.g. perquisites, see
Werker and Ahmed 2008:79) for their own benefit. These efforts are not necessarily
made in bad faith. Persons already engaged in a particular international field are
often convinced that they are the most knowledgeable and thus the most valuable
actors. Newcomers to the field are believed to do much worse or to even cause harm.
For similar reasons, when several providers act in the market, cartels tend to be
formed in order to prevent “noxious” competition. In particular, international
organizations have an incentive to suppress competition by dividing up the field of
activity according to regions and specific sub-types of activity.
As the contestability of an international market is at least partly endogenous, it
would be a mistake to directly derive the efficiency of international organizations
from the market form observed. Nevertheless, to analyze and establish how many
international organizations are active in a particular field is a useful starting point.
External competition among international organizations should be an important area
of research. However, this research, to my best knowledge, has rarely been
performed. Two aspects are in need of more analysis: the existing market forms and
their consequences.
2.1 Market Form
First of all, it is essential to closely look at and understand the market forms in which
international organizations act, i.e. the current status and its development over time.
It is important to understand the dynamics especially as globalization of the
economy has changed the world order (The Economist 2008). A crucial issue is the
question about how easy it is to establish a new international organization, and how
often international organizations disappear again. There seems to be an ever-
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increasing demand for international organizations (see Frey 1997; Vaubel et al.
2007). In particular, the number of international NGOs has rapidly increased over
the last few decades; its growth has been calculated to be more than 6% per year
over the last half-century. It rose from less than 200 in 1909 to nearly 1,000 in 1956,
to over 20,000 in 2005 (Werker and Ahmed 2008:75, 82). If new areas of activity
opened up (e.g. with respect to communication) or were artificially created, the
market form may still be characterized by oligopolistic or even monopolistic
competition. If, in contrast, growth occurs in established areas, market forms will be
characterized by more competition. As the definition of a “market” is vague, only a
careful analysis of particular areas may show whether competition has increased or
decreased.
2.2 Consequences of Market Forms
Market forms tend to have a significant effect on the size and composition of
international goods and services provided. A challenging question is whether
wasteful competition exists in international markets, i.e. whether the activity levels
of a large number of suppliers is additive or sub-additive, perhaps even negative. It
has sometimes been argued that international lending is a case in point. Competing
international organizations lending money may provoke a race to the bottom by
reducing the conditionalities imposed (see, e.g., Steinwand and Stone 2008). There
is evidence that the same applies to international aid agencies. According to Easterly
and Pfutze (2008: 38) “… aid agencies split their assistance between too many
donors, too many countries and too many sectors for each donor, where “too many”
reflects the view that having multiple donors and multiple projects forfeits the gains
of specialization and leads to higher-than-necessary overhead costs for both donors
and recipients.” Such unproductive fragmentation has been found to be widespread
with respect to aid; an example is the United States, which has more than 50
different bureaucratic units with overlapping responsibilities involved in giving
foreign assistance (Easterly and Pfutze 2008:38–41). The negative externalities
produced by the efforts to help, as well as the large fixed set-up costs may well
produce poorer results than if only one (or a few) organizations had been active. The
existence of a large number of aid agencies may also shift the power from deserving
to undeserving aid recipients. In areas controlled by warlords, one of the few
bargaining chips available to nongovernmental organizations that are delivering
humanitarian assistance is the threat of pulling out. “…should, say, Médecins Sans
Frontières make a noisy withdrawal from a certain area, in a world of many NGO
actors, it is likely to be replaced by another organization. This makes the threat of
withdrawal far less powerful” (Werker and Ahmed 2008: 87–88). Care must be
taken that these results are not unduly generalized as long as there are so few
empirical studies analyzing these issues. The conclusions about the possibly negative
effects of a large number of competitors are far from obvious, especially if one takes
into account that in developed economies the willingness to donate money might
well diminish if donors do not have the possibility to give to the humanitarian
organization of their choice. The possibly reduced effectiveness of the aid must be
weighed against the possibly reduced amount of donations. Similarly, politicians and
public officials of smaller countries may prefer to fund smaller international
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organizations in which they can exert more influence than in large ones, which may
be dominated by the major national powers.
These are, in my view, important questions that so far do not seem to have been
sufficiently addressed by academics.
3 Inside Competition
The stronger the internal political competition is, the more international organiza-
tions are forced to consider the preferences of the citizens they represent, or of the
donors who are funding them. Yet, such internal competition is seriously hampered
by the fact that donors in most cases have only limited interest in what international
organizations do.4 Their preferences are muted and are rarely openly expressed. As a
result, international organizations have a substantial amount of discretionary power,
which bureaucracy tends to use for its own advantage. These aspects have been
extensively analyzed in the Public Choice Approach to international organizations
(e.g. Vaubel 1986; Frey 1984; Dreher 2004). Here, only issues of financing and
decision rules are discussed because the proposals advanced seek to improve on
them.
3.1 Financing
Many non-governmental international organizations are financed through donations.
Indeed, many NGOs have essentially become fundraising institutions (Werker and
Ahmed 2008:88). The directors of these organizations are forced to comply with the
wishes of their benefactors. However, most donors are not much interested in what
organizations actually do but are motivated by the “warm glow” they will feel when
they become benefactors. They tend to not monitor the activities of the organizations
but believe what the organizations proclaim. The organizations are thus induced to
spend a considerable share of their revenue on propaganda, an aspect pointed out by
Tullock (1967) long ago. Administrative and fundraising costs can amount to more
than 10% of total costs (Werker and Ahmed 2008:88). Some potential donors have
reacted by informing themselves about the activities of international organizations
through certified controllers. Their task is simplified when performances of
competing organizations can be compared. The problem of a limited demand for
information by donors, and a limited capability to monitor the activities, nevertheless
remains. This allows privately financed international organizations to enjoy
considerable liberties and discretionary room to exploit donors and use them to
their advantage.
Difficulties arise in the many instances in which governments finance
international organizations. Usually bureaucratic, input oriented rules are applied
but such rules tend to lead to inefficiencies and distortions. International
organizations receive a steady flow of revenue, independent and regardless of their
performance. As a consequence they have an incentive to inflate expenditures to
4 An exception are large scandals, which decision makers of international organizations go through great
trouble to avoid, and even more so, to suppress the surfacing of the respective information.
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conform to the revenue flow, or even to worsen the problems they are supposed to
remedy. But such rules have the advantage of being easy to administrate and are
therefore often used (e.g. in the United Nations system).
The situation changes when funding is made dependent on the performance of an
international organization. However, such funding is incentive compatible and
induces the leaders of international organizations to act in the interest of the
governments financing them. This would be the case if an environmental
organization were to be funded according to the improvements in the environment
produced, or a peace promoting organization corresponding to the achieved
reduction in the probability of wars. Such a financing procedure is extremely
difficult to administrate, as it is necessary to clearly identify the contribution made
by the respective international organization. The same problem arises when
international organizations are given the right to tax individuals and firms in
accordance with the benefits achieved. Such financing is again incentive compatible.
However, if it is difficult to identify the contribution of a certain organization it
could lead to distortions. If a particular organization is credited with the
improvement of a particular global situation (say, if the condition of the environment
has been improved along some dimension) but if this improvement is due to external
factors (e.g. a business downturn), or if other actors and organizations are in fact
responsible for the improvement, the funding of the organization is wasteful and
leads to the survival of international organizations that do not perform a useful
activity.
3.2 Decision Rules
The extent to which the preferences of citizens are reflected in the actions of
international organizations depends decisively on the institution’s decision making.
They determine the relationship between the citizens as principals and the actors in
international organizations as agents. This specific principal–agent relationship is
far more complicated than in firms or in national governments (Vaubel 2006;
Michaelowa and Borrmann 2006). There are many more steps in this relationship
between the citizens and these actors. Under democratic conditions, citizens elect a
national parliament, which in turn elects a government. The government, or rather
the specific ministries in charge, will select delegates who will represent the national
interests in the international organization. The leaders of international organizations
are supposed to follow the decisions made by the delegates of the member countries.
They charge their officials in the centre to devise the corresponding policies, which
then have to be communicated to the employees in the field. There are thus several
layers to the principal-agent relationship that provide international organizations
with a considerable discretionary room and allow them to act in an inefficient and
wasteful way (Vaubel 2006; Frey and Gygi 1991; Frey 1997). The principal–agent
relationship between national delegates and the leaders of an international
organization is strengthened when the share of votes corresponds to the share of
money contributed, such as in the UN financial organizations, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As a result there is a dominant “shareholder,”
the United States, interested in the international organization’s efficiency (Vaubel
1996). It may, however, be argued that these organizations act in the interest of the
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dominant shareholder rather than in the interest of a more global community (see, e.g.,
Dreher and Jensen 2007).
4 Plea for Innovative Proposals
The analysis suggests that both internal and external competition for international
organizations is rather weak and that the performance of international organizations
is far from ideal. It does not match the pressing problems of current and future
international governance. There exists considerable room for improvement. Despite
the fact that our analytical knowledge about the workings of international
organizations is still quite limited, it seems possible to advance proposals designed
to strengthen competition and hopefully make international organizations perform
better. The scope of institutional innovations has not been sufficiently explored;
indeed it seems to me that researchers in the field accept the status quo too readily. I
wish to argue that for researchers an important objective should be to bring forth
new ideas, even if they are only partial, and their success uncertain.
To illustrate the potential usefulness of improving the performance of interna-
tional organizations, I discuss eight proposals that could serve as input in a scholarly
discourse process, and later on could be used as a possible building block for the
construction of new institutions, and the improvement of existing ones.
External competition can be strengthened through the following proposals:
Proposal 1. International Competition Agency
An organization can be established that assumes the task of identifying and
eliminating entry barriers into markets for international organizations. This agency
should also identify under which specific conditions competition among interna-
tional organizations may become wasteful, taking into account all relevant
considerations. Moreover it could be given the task of coordinating the competitive
activities of independent international organizations, whose uncoordinated action
have led to undesirable results in the past, such as a possible exploitation through
undeserving aid recipients.
The structure of an international competition agency could be similar to that of
existing competition agencies in national markets. With respect to their performance,
experiences with such agencies have not always been positive and the results are not
beyond criticism. It has been argued that these agencies could get “captured” by
particular strong interests. There lurks a danger that a competition agency for
international organizations could become subservient to national governments and
existing interest groups. If this indeed happens, coordinating activities by the
international competition agency would worsen conditions. They might well result in
favouring politically well connected, but inefficient international organizations. On
the other hand, possibly efficient but politically powerless, international organiza-
tions might be excluded. An undisputedly positive contribution of an international
competition agency is that they may provide useful information on international
market conditions.
The founding of a competition agency to monitor international organizations
presupposes a superior power, able to coerce and punish them if necessary. It could
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be thought that in the United Nation system the sub-agencies such as UNESCO,
World Bank or IMF could meet this condition. However, these international
organizations have acquired so much power of their own that they are largely
immune to such pressures. Moreover, in many cases there exists no superior power
willing and able to monitor the competitive conditions in the various international
markets. For these reasons, while desirable, it is most unlikely that such an
international competition agency will ever be founded and has any impact.
Proposal 2. International Competition Rules
International law can be employed to strengthen and open markets for
international organizations and to curb the exploitation through monopolistic and
oligopolistic providers, including cartels. An independent international competition
court can be established in order to prevent the violation of competition rules.
This proposal follows the idea of using international law with respect to human
rights, and the respective court, established by a voluntary constitutional consensus
among most countries in the world (though several important countries, among
them the United States, do not, at least not fully, participate). Even though the
court is far from functioning perfectly, it is still true that in many cases even the
most powerful countries—which could not be forced into compliance—honour
the international legal arrangements. Many nations determined that it is in their
long-term best interest to follow the rules, and to respect the independence of the
court even though it may be disadvantageous to them in individual cases. Even if
some countries sometimes disregard the rules agreed upon, the constitutional
consensus need not break down but may survive. Competition rules addressing
international organizations tend to emerge over time and arise from the demand for
better functioning global governance. This process is likely to be slow and
incomplete. For a considerable time to come the main function of the rules will be
“expressive,” i.e. indicating the desired direction, rather than a binding constraint
on the international organizations.
Proposal 3. International Monitoring Institute
A scientific organization can be created which will report and inform about
existing situations and expected future trends with respect to the internal and
external competition of international organizations. As it is not given any power to
intervene or coerce but will fulfil a useful role, little opposition to its establishment is
to be expected. However, exactly because its role in improving global governance is
only advisory, its establishment and financing is not likely to be seen as a high
priority.
The next two proposals seek to strengthen the internal competition within an
international organization.
Proposal 4. Vouchers
Individuals, households and communities can be given vouchers allowing them to
“purchase” the services of international organizations. The recipients turn in the
vouchers to a central voucher fund, which will give the corresponding agency an
increase in its budget. The vouchers develop a secondary market in which the price
of the vouchers reflects the preferences of the recipients.
344 B.S. Frey
Vouchers can only be used for specific private goods and services but this part of
the activity of international organizations, or at least of NGOs, is of great
importance. Most of the spending of NGOs has been documented to have been
allocated for goods and services going to individuals (Werker and Ahmed 2008:89).
Voucher schemes have indeed been implemented on a restricted scale and they have
been found to work well (Harvey 2007; Catholic Relief Services 2006). In contrast,
vouchers given to prospective recipients for goods and services with strong public
good elements are unfeasible due to the standard economic arguments of failing
markets.
Proposal 5. Matching Contributions by Citizens
This proposal seeks to influence the behaviour of international organizations by
addressing “…the only “market force” in NGO-sector industry, where donors can be
viewed as desiring to improve the quantity and quality of the product of the NGO…”
(Werker and Ahmed 2008:78). Each citizen is encouraged to make contributions out
of his or her private pocket to the various international organizations. A variant of
this proposal would be that citizens could determine that a share of the taxes they
pay will be distributed to the international organizations of their choice. The national
government will match these donations by a given factor, for instance ten times the
total sum earmarked by the individual donors. In order to secure their funding, the
international organizations are so forced to inform citizens of what they do, what
they have achieved in the past and what they plan to do in the future. Those
organizations that are best able to convince the citizens that their donations will be
spent wisely can expect to receive the most funds; the principal–agent relationship is
thereby strengthened.
Introducing matching contributions may tempt international organizations to
spend excessive sums on popularizing their activities instead of doing the actual
work. It should be noted that every recipient of government funds faces such
temptation but it normally applies to a small group of relevant decision makers rather
than the whole population of citizens. To impress the former may be cheaper than if
the latter have to be addressed. The problem is, however, that democratic rules
demand that the preferences of the citizens as principals have to be respected and not
those of their agents.
Three arguments are certain to be advanced against the proposal of giving citizens
the right to directly allocate funds to international organizations. It could be argued
that citizens are not informed, educated or motivated enough to make a reasoned
decision. And so, not the most worthy but rather the international organizations that
best sell their activity will benefit. These are the same arguments raised against any
form of direct citizen participation in political decisions. It may well be true that
under the existing conditions citizens are ill informed, poorly educated and
motivated compared to the decisions taken by the government and the public
administration. This is only rational, as the citizens do not benefit from having such
knowledge. However, empirical evidence shows that once citizens have the right to
directly participate, they learn to take in relevant information, they educate
themselves on the issues in question, and they have a motivation to participate
(see Stutzer and Benz 2004; Olken 2008). The arguments against letting the citizens
have a say in allocating the funds going to international organizations are not
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persuasive. The major reason why this proposal of matching contributions is prone
to meet opposition by national governments and bureaucracies as well as
legislatures, is that it reduces their power. The proposal only has a chance of being
implemented behind the veil of ignorance, i.e. before people know in what situation
they will find themselves in the future. Under that condition people may well
establish matching contributions in respective laws or even the constitution. The
same may be possible if governments lack resources and can only induce citizens to
agree with spending money for international organizations in exchange for having a
say in the respective decisions.
Proposal 6. Popular Participation Rights
Giving citizens direct political participation rights can mitigate the fundamental
principal-agent problem that has been identified above. This may extend to include
the election of delegates to international organizations and the right to vote on major
decisions via popular referenda. The latter include both a mandatory or optional
vote, as well as popular initiatives to put an issue on the agenda. The direct political
participation rights may be exercised by the citizens of a country as a whole (such as
done in Switzerland) or may be delegated to “trustees.” The “trustees” are selected
from the total population in each country by a random drawing ensuring that every
citizen has an equal chance of being chosen. The number of trustees elected for each
country can be proportional to population size or to any other criterion chosen (see
more fully Frey and Stutzer 2006).
This proposal is inspired by the favourable experiences made in semi-direct
democracies such as Switzerland.5 It might be argued that under these conditions
interest groups will try to influence the decisions of the trustees, while in non-
democratic countries rulers will force trustees to vote in accordance with their
demands. This is true but no worse than present conditions in which the national
delegates are subject to similar pressures. Indeed, being elected trustee may provide
a measure of autonomy, especially if voting is anonymous.
Similar arguments as the ones against matching contributions will surely be raised
against this proposal, and with even more force, as the citizens are given even more
power. Such direct political participation rights have little chance of being
introduced in countries that are completely committed to representative democracy.
Interestingly enough, however, recent developments show that citizens in several
countries have been given more participation rights in international governance issue
than they have in domestic issues. The formation and extension of the European
Union was subject to a number of popular referenda in Ireland, Denmark, the
Netherlands and France. The “European political class” of established politicians has
made every effort to disregard the referenda outcomes because in many cases they
have been against their wishes and plans. Nevertheless, popular decisions have
played a significant role in the European integration process, and it may be expected
that this will be increasingly the case in the future.
5 For the institution of direct democracy see, e.g., Kriesi (2005), for econometric analyses of their
consequences on production see Kirchgässner et al. (1999), and on happiness Frey and Stutzer (2002),
Frey (2008).
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Proposal 7. Using Prediction Markets to Provide Information6
A fundamental problem of international organizations, which was identified
above, is that management is often badly informed, not only about the principals’
desire, but also about what can be done and how it can be achieved. Prediction
markets may help to overcome this informational gap and allow managers to utilize
the decentralized nature of information. Many people have a wealth of personal
knowledge about international organizations but have so only in an extremely
incomplete and partial way. Prediction markets give individuals an incentive to share
the information they have and to put it at the disposal of a centre, which aggregates
this information. Under these conditions the aggregate information gained is superior
to other sources of information that are often even more incomplete and distorted.
Prediction markets could, for example, be used when an international organiza-
tion considers engaging in a major new area, or intends to strongly step up its
activities in the traditional area. The information collected via a prediction market
makes use of the often extensive and intimate knowledge of specialists and gives
them a positive and profitable experience and an occasion to bring it forth.
Prediction markets have first been used, often with good results, to predict the
outcome of elections (see Berg et al. 2008; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). As
participants obtain a monetary gain by predicting well, they have an incentive to
provide an objective evaluation of what party or person will win an election rather
than supplying an ideologically biased opinion. The technique has been used with
good results in many firms. Employees are encouraged to share their “best”
evaluation of a planned policy in order to predict as accurately as possible the
eventual outcome, and to therewith win the competition (see Plott and Chen 2002).
Prediction markets are a unique and unconventional way to collect information
and for that reason tend to be opposed by conservatively oriented, international
bureaucracies. They will argue that this method of gathering information is chaotic
and will not lead to valuable and usable results. However, the major reason for their
resistance is that the top bureaucrats will lose part of their power by admitting that
their level of information is so limited. It must, therefore, be expected that prediction
markets will only be employed if they are imposed from outside (for instance by a
board of external directors) or, more likely, when the leaders of an international
organization are at a loss and urgently need the informational inputs from a wide
spectrum of experts and participants.
Proposal 8. Institutionalized Devil’s Advocate
A major problem of all organizations is that once a “consensus” on an
interpretation or policy action seems to have been reached, dissenting views are
henceforth discouraged and even punished socially as being against the “ésprit de
corps.” In public, everyone appears to concur, though in fact quite a number of
persons have grave doubts (“group think,” see Janis 1982; Janis and Mann 1977).
However, these reservations are not expressed because everyone is well aware that
superiors and colleagues would not like such criticism, and that personal career
6 I owe this proposal to Felix Oberholzer-Gee.
Outside and inside competition for international organizations… 347
prospects could suffer or perhaps even end. Only when a policy has proven to be futile,
does it become apparent that many people had entertained and favoured different ideas –
but such ex post revelation does not improve the quality of the organization.
In order to overcome the formation of a false consensus and to keep open the
discussion, governments intending to form an international organization can agree to
appoint a devil’s advocate, a position assigned to discovering flaws in the major
interpretations and decisions made. The job of a devil’s advocate is to produce sound
and powerful arguments against policies proposed by the leaders of international
organizations. The devil’s advocate must therefore be independent from the
organizations worked for. He or she must derive prestige from doing his or her job
well, opening career prospects in other organizations or activities. A devil’s advocate
can serve as a powerful antidote to “group think” and other distortions in policy
making. An office specifically assigned to this task may also achieve the same
results, provided it is truly independent of the international organization that is to be
monitored. Moreover, the incentives of its members must be clearly defined and well
structured. The persons working in such an office must be able to successfully
pursue their career and do their job unhindered even if they are critical of the
activities of the international organization in question.
The institution of advocatus diaboli has proven its usefulness in the Catholic
Church over centuries. It has served as an institutionalized opposition to an
excessive or erroneous creation of saints, which would be damaging for the Church
in the long run. The institution ensures that only those persons are sanctified, about
whom the advocatus diaboli, despite serious effort, could not find any negative
aspects. This institution has worked well but was undermined by the former pope
John Paul II with the result that under his reign more saints than ever before in the
history of the church were created. Many observers find this practice to be
inflationary and against the interests of the church.
A disadvantage of the position of devil’s advocate is its inherently negative role as
an opponent. This may be overcome by giving the person in charge the right to
advance counterproposals. The institution then closely resembles the popularly
elected commissions of account (“Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen”). These
institutions have been empirically shown to discipline governments and to induce
them to come closer to voters’ preferences (Eichenberger and Schelker 2007).
A devil’s advocate is not necessarily an effective solution to overcome “group
think.” An organization may well react by isolating him or her, or by not taking
seriously the objections raised. However, this could be counteracted by forcing
leaders of an international organization to explicitly and publicly discuss the
objections raised, and to show why, in their opinion, they are not persuasive. An
organization is unlikely to appoint a devil’s advocate as it conflicts with the goal of
pursuing a coherent policy. It must therefore be introduced from outside, in
preference when an international organization is established.
5 Analysis and Proposals
Existing international organizations are characterized by weak external and internal
competition. Their performance is, therefore, far from ideal and there exists
348 B.S. Frey
considerable room for improvement. To strengthen competition, eight proposals for
improvement are discussed. Three of them seek to raise competition among
international organizations, an aspect, which has been rather neglected in the
literature on international organizations. The proposals are informed by national
competition policy that suggests an international competition agency, international
competition rules, and an international monitoring institute. Five proposals seek to
intensify the competition within international organizations. Three proposals seek to
strengthen the influence of the principals, the national citizens of an international
organization’s member countries, by suggesting that recipients receive vouchers, that
the citizens’ contributions are matched by the national governments, and that citizens
are given direct political participation rights with respect to international organ-
izations. The last two proposals suggest that prediction markets are used to improve
information flow, and that an institutionalized devil’s advocate is established.
These proposals are introduced in order to stimulate new ideas and innovations
with respect to international organizations, an aspect somewhat neglected in the
scholarly literature. The proposals advanced here are only preliminary and far from
ideal. Indeed, against each of them many arguments can be raised—but this can be
done against any new idea or proposal. New ideas are quite generally met with
scepticism and it is difficult to put them into practice. By design, they oppose the
interests of well-established groups and, therefore, are not welcome or easily
accepted. Moreover, new ideas do not necessarily represent an improvement;
sometimes they are worse than what already exists and, therefore, are rightly
rejected. Despite these basic difficulties it still seems useful that social scientists
bring forth unconventional, new proposals because they may have an impact in the
future. Examples are the trading in environmental rights or the introduction of road
pricing which, for a long time, have been ridiculed by politicians and the general
public, but now have been adopted in several countries. Some careful optimism is
therefore warranted that new proposals have a chance, also in the case of
international organizations.
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